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Summary
The main intention of this paper is to reconstruct the conceptual and histori-
cal genesis of the idea and value of political peace from the point of view of 
political philosophy at the intersection between late scholasticism and early 
modernity. The paper consists of three related parts. The first part highlights 
methodological and contextual reasons why the idea of political peace has 
been overshadowed throughout history by dominant discourses on war. The 
second part deals with conceptual clarifications. The nature of war is distin-
guished from other types of conflict and three interpretative approaches to 
war are analyzed: political realism, fundamentalist-moralistic view of the holy 
war, and the many theories of natural law that give rise to conceptions of just 
war, but also the first abolitionist perspective or idea of ending all wars. Early 
theoretical articulations of the notion of peace indicated modern-day emanci-
pation of politics from the tutelage of metaphysics and classical ethics, thus 
separating the value of political peace from its original oneness with cosmic 
and psychological peace. The third part of the paper highlights key moments 
in the historical genesis of the value of political peace in the works of Aurelius 
Augustine, Marsilius of Padua, and William of Ockham.
Keywords: Violence and War, Political Peace, Aurelius Augustine, Marsilius of 
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Introduction
The primary intention of this paper is to reconstruct the preconditions and genesis 
of the idea and value of political peace that led to the theoretical articulation of the 
two most influential conceptions of political peace in the early modern period. The 
first one is Hobbes’s conception of political peace which is based on the principles 
of instrumental rationality and mutual advantages in the pragmatic concept of mo-
dus vivendi, whereas the second one is Kant’s ethical-legal conception which for 
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the first time elevates humanity to the status of an ethical and legal subject in the 
cosmopolitan project of eternal peace. Both Hobbes’s and Kant’s conceptions are 
certainly worthy of special and separate consideration. However, in this paper, I 
will analyze the reasons and causes that made the idea of political peace an impor-
tant theme and value of philosophical and theoretical-political considerations at the 
threshold between the Middle Ages and the modern era.
Theoretical interest in the idea and value of political peace stems from a mul-
titude of reasons. The underlying theoretical reason lies in the fact modern political 
philosophy and ethics challenge the instrumentalization of human lives in the name 
of so-called higher religious, ideological and metaphysical goals, thus gradually af-
firming the naturalistic principle of factuality and human life as a value and moral 
right in itself. From today’s perspective, there are two additional motives for inte-
rest in the subject of peace. The centennial anniversary of the First World War, the 
first world conflict of global proportions, provides historical distance for a much-
needed reflection on humankind’s self-inflicted tragedies. Moreover, one of Hob-
bes’s illustrations of the factual equivalent of his methodical construction of ‘natu-
ral state’ – an international community in which “... in all times, Kings, and Persons 
of Sovereign Authority, because of their Independency, are in continual jealousies, 
and in the state and posture of Gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their 
eyes fixed on one another” – is still relevant today, just like his famous definition 
according to which war “consisteth not in Battell only, or the act of fighting; but 
in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known...”1
The primary intention of the paper will be explained through three related sec-
tions. First, I will point out the methodological and contextual reasons why the idea 
of political peace has always been overshadowed throughout its history by domi-
nant discourses on war. At the same time, I will outline the preconditions and rea-
sons why the value of political peace was positively established in the modern era 
nonetheless. 
In the second part of the paper, I will emphasize the need for conceptual de-
lineations and clarifications with regard to discourses on both war and peace. Fur-
thermore, I will examine elementary distinctions – that is, definitions of war on the 
one hand, and various types of conflict on the other – as well as differences between 
three interpretative approaches to war: political realism, fundamentalist-moralistic 
view of holy war, and various theories of natural law and their derivatives. Within 
this last position, I will single out the distinction between justified and unjustified 
wars, as well as the abolitionist perspective aiming at effectively ending all wars.
1 Hobbes, 1985, part I, chap. XIII, pp. 185-187. In short, war is potentially present anytime and 
anywhere where there are no guarantees of peace.
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When it comes to the discourse on peace, it is analytically important to distin-
guish three fundamental uses of the term ‘peace’ in the European history of ideas: 
a) cosmic or metaphysical peace; b) peace of a city/state or political peace; c) inner, 
mental or psychological peace. With the modern emancipation of politics from the 
tutelage of metaphysics and classical ethics, and with the dissolution of the original 
unity of these three levels of peace, the value of political peace has become a spe-
cific issue of political philosophy and political theory.
In the third part of the paper, I will highlight key moments in the historical ge-
nesis of the public moral idea and value of political peace in the works of Aurelius 
Augustine, Marsilius of Padua, and William of Ockham.
In conclusion, I would like to point out two main points. The historical genesis 
and conceptual analysis of the value of political peace show that it does not belong 
to metaphysical or worldview morality, but rather that it belongs to public or politi-
cal morality important for liberal-democratic political culture. And secondly, politi-
cal peace is not the opposite of rivalry and conflict in utopian reveries beyond all 
social and political tensions, political peace is the opposite of war or violent and 
unscrupulous conflict resolution.
1. Discourses on War vs. Discourses on Peace
How to understand the relationship between war and peace? Should this relation-
ship be viewed solely, or at least primarily, at an intuitively persuasive linear and 
synchronic level that reveals their diametrically opposed natures? Or should one 
also permit – and under what conditions – diachronic considerations that regard 
the relationship between war and peace within the framework of relative functional 
connection, revealing at the same time the paradoxical nature of war? Every (or al-
most every) war ideologically seeks to legitimize itself as a pursuit of peace – that 
is, violence is allegedly resorted to solely for the purpose of eliminating violence.2 
2 The first relatively systematic philosophical discussion of peace as an ethical and political ideal 
– in fact, an ontologically determined aspiration of every single nature, particularly human nature 
– is brought up by Aurelius Augustine in chapter XIX of his famous work The City of God. From 
the ontological and moral-psychological premise of the universal human striving for peace, Augus-
tine exposes the paradoxical nature of war. “[If] there is no man who does not wish to be joyful, 
neither is there anyone who does not wish to have peace. For even they who make war desire 
nothing but victory — desire, that is to say, to attain to peace with glory. For what else is victory 
than the conquest of those who resist us? And when this is done there is peace. It is therefore 
with the desire for peace that wars are waged...” (Augustin, 1996, XIX, 12.1, p. 45). Admittedly, 
Aristotle also mentioned that “the goal of war is peace” (Politics, 1988a, 1334 a 15, p. 246), but 
only incidentally as a conceptual pair with ‘occupation’ and ‘leisure’, illustrating the complex-
ity of statesmanship.
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Discourses on war have throughout history quantitatively considerably over-
shadowed discourses on peace. High moral justifications for war have always been 
sought and always found – violated dignity, pride, justice, faith, sacredness, defense 
of life. Peace, on the other hand, has usually been defined in a descriptive and me-
thodically negative way – as a state in which there is no war; or pragmatically – as 
a state ensuing when warring parties, due to their exhaustion, have practically no 
other option but peace, or when one side completely defeats the other, leading to 
unconditional surrender and the so-called victorious peace.3 There are several rea-
sons why discourses on war have gained normative priority.4 First and foremost, the 
main reason at the phenomenological level is the human fascination with violence. 
The usual legalistic definitions of violence as the unlawful use of force in causing 
injuries and damage are obviously too narrow. Not only do they not explain war 
conflicts between states, but they also overlook the existence of situations where 
it is illegal, although obviously legitimate to resort to violence. On the other hand, 
too broad uses of the concept of violence, which include fundamental social injus-
tices or the so-called structural violence, as well as linguistic forms as an aspect of 
symbolic violence, show the diversity and diffused limits of the phenomenon of 
violence, but at the same time analytically blur the essence of violence more than 
they illuminate it.5 Therefore, we are left with an intuitively acceptable definition 
3 Reliable philosophical studies about peace are very rare in Croatian philosophical literature. One 
exception are the highly instructive studies by Žarko Puhovski, which this paper relies on as well. 
See Puhovski (2003, 2015, 2018).
4 Among the first to effectively expose the paradoxical nature of the human relationship to war 
and peace was Erasmus of Rotterdam. In his essay “The Complaint of Peace”, the personification 
of peace never ceases to wonder at the fact that despite being the basis of all human good, every-
where it goes seeking rest – among kings, priests, prophets, scholars – it is despised and rejected, 
while war, which brings destruction and misery, is at the same time extolled and eulogized. Peace 
is particularly dismayed to learn that from those whom, in view of Christ’s message of peace, unity 
and mutual love, he expected the most from – Christian rulers and priests – he receives nothing but 
an ungodly and blasphemous championing of war. Erasmus’s bitter persiflage of the foolishness of 
the human race – because “we may be angry with the wicked, but we can only pity the insane”
(p. 2) – nonetheless ends with an appeal “to all who call themselves Christians... to unite with 
one heart and one soul, in the abolition of war, and the establishment of perpetual and universal 
peace” (p. 77). See Erasmus, 1917 (A.D. 1521). However, when it comes to his pacifist senti-
ments, it should be added that, in accordance with the actions of Pope Leo X, Erasmus confines 
the ideal of peace to res publica Christiana, with the aim of fighting the Turks more efficiently.
5 An example of one such (too) broad use of the term ‘violence’, which conflates the phenomena 
of violence, structural social injustices, power and authority, but does not distinguish legitimate 
from illegitimate uses, force from power, or domination from authority, is Slavoj Žižek’s book 
Violence (2008), which is based on the Foucaultian paradigm of the ubiquitous and all-pervasive 
microphysics of power. 
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according to which violence is direct, illegal and illegitimate use of coercion in 
causing objectively identifiable harm to the other party despite their opposition. 
Violence is characterized by immediacy, speed of action and efficiency. It is the 
most primitive, but also the most widespread way of communication understood 
even by those who pretend not to understand, as well as by those who really have 
trouble understanding. The self-evidence and naturalness of violence allows for ar-
bitrariness, temporary exoneration from justification – you can just because you can 
– and the position of ultimate judge.
In a long-term perspective, nevertheless, violence reveals its instrumental na-
ture. This means that it tries to be understood with regard to the goals it leads to 
or seeks to achieve. Such justification of violence through the prism of righteous 
goals, however, only partially touches upon the nature of violence, since goals de-
termine the permissibility of the use of violence (Benjamin, 1971) rather than vio-
lence as such. Moreover, not only do justified goals tell the truth about the nature 
of violent means, but vice versa as well – the nature of violent means, despite self-
deceptive rationalizations, also reveals the truth about the goals themselves.
It is perfectly acceptable that there are situations, such as self-defense, where 
resorting to violence is the most rational choice.6 However, such situations, in 
which ends may justify violent means, require that there should be no viable alter-
natives to violent means and that the ends should be coerced, existentially crucial, 
immediate and short-term. Any long-term, systemic and strategic use of violence 
transforms violence from a coerced and possibly justified reaction into an unjusti-
fied and illegitimate principle of action.7 
6 Pacifism, or unconditional elimination of violence, is a kind of moral absolutism and as such 
prima facie attractive, but nonetheless an overly demanding and hardly feasible position. This 
does not mean underestimating pacifism, especially its moral value, but primarily means, in the 
absence of institutional guarantees, a limited political reach of such a view. The classic pacifism 
of the Western cultural circle, in its many different forms and manifestations, was initially associ-
ated with the lifestyles of isolated religious communities – for instance, the Christian movement 
in the first three centuries of the new era and modern Protestant denominations such as Menno-
nites, Amish and Quakers – but also with various philosophical and secular traditions. Modern and 
contemporary pacifism, with its standard anchorage in the absolute moral duty of nonviolence and 
respect for life, at the political level occasionally evolves into the theory and practice of civil dis-
obedience, nonviolent resistance and active commitment to the values of a new culture of peace. 
See Fiala (2018 and 2018a).
7 Hannah Arendt’s distinction between the conditional justification of violence and the uncondi-
tional illegitimacy of violence, regardless of its seeming contradiction, appears to be a plausible 
theoretical model for considering the complexity of the phenomenon of violence. Resorting to vio-
lence can be justified only by the crucial and existential importance of an immediate future goal in 
exceptional and coerced situations, but it cannot be legitimate in terms of a priori authorization for 
the strategic use of violence. See Arendt (1969).
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 57, No. 4, 2020, pp. 33-59
38
It is common for violence to be given a special place in collective memory and 
in the formation of social and political identities due to its natural self-evidence and 
high effectiveness, resistance to which could even endanger one’s life. The war-
riors’ customary morality seems naturally occurring, dominant and almost univer-
sally present, strictly identifying the space of one’s moral affirmation with that of a 
battlefield.8 Wars, such narratives tell us, create heroes, while peace brings only a 
lack of challenge and stagnant mediocrity. Eternal enemies, crucial battles, politi-
cal myths and fabrication of tradition lead to collective identifications, providing a 
compelling foothold for ethnic and national identities (Tudor, 1972; Hobsbawm and 
Ranger, 2007; Bottici, 2007; Monneyron and Mouchtouris, 2012). 
Another, related, reason for the privileged status of discourse on war is that 
no other human activity instigates such a total mobilization of people. Systemic 
verbal violence and the propagation of war rhetoric, as well as various symbolic 
and physical incitements and provocations, abruptly narrow down the room for de-
cision-making and action-taking on the part of the silent, skeptical and frequently 
reserved majority. All moral, intellectual, cultural, worldview, social and political 
differences between people are drowned in the boiling water of massification and 
polarizing homogenization. Enormous mobilization forces lead to homogenization 
within groups and antagonization with regard to others. In such a suddenly reduced 
picture of the world there remains only the newly created total opposition: friend-
enemy.9 The dramatics of war rhetoric and the tragedy of war result from the fact 
that war morally empowers, legally encourages and even requires the mass taking 
of others’ lives and sacrificing one’s own (Puhovski, 2003). Such authorization to 
do anything and the elimination of every civilizational consideration are deeply and 
traumatically etched into the collective memory. Phenomenological experiences of 
war and its aftermath show that social tectonics and destruction of massive propor-
8 The assumed connection between a valid moral argument and martial domination, right reason 
and military victory, is also emphasized in a number of philosophical reflections, from Augustine’s 
narrative of Joshua’s appeal to God in a battle against the Amorites (Confessions, XI, 23, p. 271) 
to Locke’s biblical illustration of Jephthah’s victory over the Ammonites or “an appeal to heaven” 
– that is, a call to God, in the absence of a judge on earth, to judge the legitimacy of the people’s 
armed resistance and help them achieve victory against self-willed and rebellious rulers (Two 
Treatises, b. II, ch. III, sec. 21, p. 282 and ch. XIV, p. 379).
9 Contrary to the consensus perspective in understanding politics, according to which, with the 
onset of the state of war, politics ceases and is replaced by military tactics and strategy, Carl 
Schmitt advocates the conflicting perspective according to which a total conflict between substan-
tive national collectivities, expressed in a variety of ways and present in all relevant spheres of 
life, is not the end of politics, but its very essence. Hence Schmitt’s famous formulaic reduction of 
politics to the political distinction between friend and enemy, where “war is just the extreme reali-
zation of enmity” (Schmitt, 2007: 74).
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tions, with huge casualties and numerous victims, also create shortcuts – both figu-
ratively and literally over people’s heads – in achieving collective, group and indi-
vidual goals. The moral and political umbrella of “state of war” and the so-called 
higher, historical and decisive reasons, in the name of which everything is permis-
sible, eliminate ethically motivated inhibitions, a priori exonerate from moral judg-
ment and questioning of the moral cost of realizing collective shortcuts, such as the 
redistribution of natural and social resources, violent industrialization and moderni-
zation, bloc alignments, nationalist self-affirmation, imperial aspirations, geopoliti-
cal determinations. All these motives, due to their mobilizing and legitimizing ef-
fects, are wrapped up in ideological forms of seemingly inescapable, binding and 
right reasons, but ultimately rely on the silent effectiveness of violence. The state of 
war destroys the entire existing social structure and, in addition to numerous casu-
alties, creates war profiteers and renters who during the war and in its aftermath 
profoundly determine the course of material and conceptual reproduction of society.
The third and perhaps most fundamental reason for the ubiquity of discourses 
on war is the explicit or implicit premise of the inevitability or even necessity of 
wars. This metaphysical way of looking at things can take two basic forms: dialec-
tical and theodicial. Dialectical or strong conceptions, ranging from Heraclitus10 to 
Hegel11, hold that the strife of opposites is inherent in everything that exists and that 
war, therefore, governs – both figuratively and literally – the world of human affairs 
as well. Theodicial or moderate conceptions, ranging from Augustine’s eschatology 
10 The ontological and metaphorical meaning is most directly expressed in Heraclitus’s fragment 
53: “War is father of all, and king of all. He renders some gods, other men; he makes some slaves, 
others free.”
11 In his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Hegel repeatedly points out that dialectics is 
not “an adventitious art, which for very wantonness introduces confusion and a mere semblance 
of contradiction into definite notions”, but, rather, that it is “the very nature and essence of every-
thing predicated by mere understanding – the law of things and of the finite as a whole” (par. 81, 
p. 101). Reality is, therefore, “quality, as determinateness which is, as contrasted with the nega-
tion which is involved in it but distinguished from it. The negation is no longer abstract nothing, 
but as a being-there and as something, it is only a form of the something: it is as otherness” (par. 
91, p. 110). This ontological principle of negativity at the level of international relations appears as 
sovereignty to the outside and, thus, the actuality of war. “The ethical moment of war is implicit in 
what was stated above, for war should not be regarded as an absolute evil and as a purely external 
contingency whose cause is therefore itself contingent, whether this cause lies in the passions of 
rulers or nations, in injustices etc., or in anything else which is not as it should be” (Elements of 
the Philosophy of Right, par. 324, p. 449). In short, with his ontological argument – “The state is 
an individual, and negation is an essential component of individuality; thus, even if a number of 
states join together as a family, this league, in its individuality, must generate opposition and cre-
ate an enemy” (ibid., par. 324. Addition, p. 450) – Hegel rejects Kant’s project of perpetual peace 
as the highest practical ideal.
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of salvation to Rousseau’s12 and Marx’s13 secular philosophy of history leading to, 
respectively, civil and universal human emancipation, hold that conflict, war and 
destruction are necessary but also final because they create the prerequisites for the 
ultimate emancipation and the triumph of good. Both of these conceptions – dia-
lectical and theodicial – share two basic characteristics. The subject of history is 
divided into the primary, metaphysical level, whether it being logos, world spirit, 
God’s predestination, providence of nature, conflict between production relations 
and productive forces, and the secondary realm of human action which, through 
people’s passions and intentions, unknowingly serves metaphysical purposes. Se-
condly, such a world divided into higher and lower realms explicitly or implicitly 
abolishes human responsibility in warfare by appealing to higher, metaphysical or 
historical reasons in the name of which everything is permissible (Raunić, 2018). 
All three of these reasons – natural self-evidence, directness and effectiveness of 
war violence; authorization to do anything during the war and the suppression of all 
differences within belligerents while at the same time rejecting any consideration 
for others; and, finally, belief in the necessity and unavoidability of war – support 
the centuries-old dominance of discourse on war. It was only in the modern era that 
the prerequisites for the affirmation of the idea of political peace as a public-moral 
ideal were created, primarily due to the following key factors:14
1. The affirmation of human life and the self-positioning of man. Late-Renais-
sance humanism affirmed the principle of individual subjectivity and elevated the 
value of human life. Modern political philosophy, rudimentarily in Machiavelli’s 
writings and systematically in Hobbes’s, articulated the idea of the emancipation of 
humankind from the normativity of nature and God’s predestination – affirming the 
self-positioning of human cohabitation in will and construction.
12 For Rousseau’s theodicial model of history set forth in his works A Discourse upon the Ori-
gin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men and The Social Contract, see Neuhouser (2008) 
and Raunić (2014). 
13 Marx’s philosophy of history, which replaces Hegel’s labor of the concept or phenomenology 
of consciousness with the concept of labor or the self-creation of man, finds in the inevitability 
of the course of history the structural condition for world revolution and the radical emancipation 
of man. As Marx says, “the transcendence of self-estrangement follows the same course as self-
estrangement” (“Private Property and Communism”, Marx, 1976: 272); that is, “communism is 
the riddle of history solved and it knows itself to be this solution” (ibid.: 275). This inverted and 
prospectively set Hegel’s legacy is manifested in the temptations of teleological knowledge of the 
necessary course of history (see particularly Marx’s afterword to the second edition of Capital), 
which then leads to philosophy of history displacing political philosophy or making it unnecessary 
(cf. Löwith, 1990).
14 A broader overview of these factors can be found in Raunić (2005: 125-171).
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2. The schism of 1517 fragmented the image of the world and led to religious 
pluralism in Europe, as well as an unprecedented spiral of religious violence culmi-
nating in the Thirty Years’ War. The inability to end military conflicts with a defini-
tive victory of one side over the other showed that a way out of long-lasting and ex-
hausting religious conflicts was not possible in the domain of worldview morality, 
but that it should rather be sought in a new domain of public or political morality 
centered on the value of political peace.
3. Modern skepticism, in particular Montaigne’s, has shown that every human 
idea and action can be questioned except for self-preservation, which is the only re-
liable and universal element in human lives. It was Hugo Grotius who introduced 
the idea of self-preservation into the moral domain of natural rights and thus set the 
course for the development of modern political philosophy. 
2. Interpretative Approaches to War and the Genesis of the Value 
of Political Peace
Every war is violence, but it is understandable that not all violence, except in the 
figurative sense, is war. War violence is characterized by planned and extremely de-
structive large-scale military conflicts between two or more political communities 
or communities driven by political goals. War violence is usually preceded by in-
tense and systematic symbolic violence and a substantial ideological reduction of an 
image of the world. This is a necessary condition for the homogenization of one’s 
own ranks and the simultaneous demonization of the opposing side. Without this, it 
would be hard to imagine the fight to the death between people who, as a rule, do 
not know each other, have nothing personally against one another, and even follow 
similar life patterns.
Interpretive approaches to war formulated three ideal-typical positions: politi-
cal realism, fundamentalist moralism of holy wars, and various natural law theories 
and their derivatives. The position of political realism justifies and limits war sole-
ly by national interests and prudential reasons. To such a view is usually attributed 
moral skepticism and amoralism, even though it is rather a break with traditional 
morality and the establishment of a special and distinct public or political moral-
ity at the heart of which is the preservation and affirmation of the power of one’s 
own political community.15 Political realism in principle does not reject classic 
moral requirements; it only judges them in the light of the supreme criterion of par-
ticular consequentialism – whether such requirements contribute to or undermine 
15 The crucial role in constituting the independence of political ethics and its detachment from the 
limitations of traditional ethics – with which then emerges the problem of “dirty hands” of politics 
– belongs, of course, to Machiavelli. See Machiavelli (2014), and for interpretations, see Berlin 
(2013) and Pocock (1975).
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the value of preserving and expanding the power of the political community in 
question.
The second position – fundamentalist moralism of holy wars – is typical of reli-
giously inspired political radicalisms, but also of their secular ideological imitators. 
Both positions see in a panaceanly imagined war of all wars – whether it is gua-
ranteed by the transcendent reasons of God’s providence or philosophical-historical 
reasons of historical necessity, whether it is the terrible Last Judgment or World 
Revolution – the instrument of righteousness and of propagating the true values of 
salvation and/or emancipation.16 Not only do such positions clearly mirror the un-
derlying conceptual paradox of every war – war violence as both a way of ending 
violence and a means of bringing peace – but they also testify to historical dramas in 
which the means used – fanatic violence and mass destruction – often vastly exceed 
merely possible, uncertain, distant and only proclaimed goals.17
The third, theoretically most far-reaching position consists of a variety of di-
verse theories interconnected by a ‘family resemblance’ of being grounded in some 
version of natural law theories and its derivatives. Within such a broad position, we 
can distinguish two main branches. According to the first one, war is inevitable and/
or possible and available moral interventions and restrictions are ultimately reduced 
only to the domain of limited regulation of methods of warfare. It is possible, and 
even necessary, to bring order into the disorder of war by means of reasonably per-
missible moral limits of action, which cannot be transgressed without moral con-
demnation. The most far-reaching contribution of this group of theories is the dis-
tinction between unjustified and justified wars.18 It rests on a set of reasonable and 
restrictive moral requirements concerning reasons for war, the way it is waged, and 
the post-war establishment of peace. The most prominent representatives of that 
16 For more about the roots of political radicalism in modern religious movements, see Walzer 
(1969). 
17 The famous closing lines of Branko Miljković’s poem Everyone will write poetry – “Those 
who cannot stand the song shall listen to the storm, but: will freedom itself sing as slaves have 
sung of it?” – poetically reveals the shadow of apprehension accompanying every emancipating 
violence.
18 The words ‘justified’ and ‘just’ are often used synonymously in Croatian philosophical lite-
rature, thereby obscuring an important semantic distinction. The term ‘just war’ is more appro-
priate for understanding war within the fundamentalist-moralistic perspective insofar as it gives 
war an unambiguous, direct and unquestionable status of an instrument in achieving the purposes 
of justice, whereas the term ‘justified war’ is more appropriate for the third position according to 
which war is inherently evil, but in certain and strictly defined circumstances it can be justified or 
excused by more important, overriding reasons in the name of which an even greater and longer-
lasting evil is being averted.
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long tradition are Christian thinkers – from Aurelius Augustine19 and Thomas Aqui-
nas, to 16th-century Portuguese and Spanish Dominicans and Jesuits such as Fran-
cisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez, to modern neo-Thomist philosophers such as 
John Finnis (1996) and Joseph Boyle (1996). 
The secular version of the theory of justified and unjustified wars was first de-
veloped by Hugo Grotius. The political assumptions and implications of his argu-
ment, based on the humanist tradition,20 aim to identify compelling reasons for in-
ternational justice and delegitimize certain types of wars, but also justify the Dutch 
colonial and imperial military campaigns.21 The most prominent contemporary pro-
ponent of the distinction between justified and unjustified wars is Michael Walzer 
(1977 and 2004), who, on the one hand, restores the tradition of natural law, but, 
on the other hand, eliminates any apriorism and openly acknowledges the limits of 
theoretical coherence in difficult questions of the morality of war. Walzer’s most 
significant contribution is considerably narrowing down within his categorical ap-
paratus the intuitively permissible notion of justified war, which he does with a con-
vincing insistence on the decisive importance of context, concrete necessities and 
responsibility of individual and collective subjects.
Whereas the first group of theorists within this position distinguishes between 
justified and unjustified wars on moral grounds, the second group is much more 
19 Augustine was the first to make a comprehensive and far-reaching theory of justified war 
which, in contrast to early Christian pacifism, tentatively accepts the necessity of warfare inso-
far as it introduces a moral perspective and a dividing line in understanding and explaining wars. 
The need to distinguish between justified and unjustified wars is explained by Augustine by three 
related reasons: 1) a physical act and its moral meaning differ, with Christian pacifism referring 
to questions of motivation or matters of heart and mind. This means that a Christian soldier does 
not sin when taking an enemy’s life if he acts with benevolence and regret in his heart (Barnes, 
1997); 2) Augustine’s concept of love for God, oneself, and one’s neighbor implies a paternalistic 
concern “that one’s neighbor loves God”, which means justifying the necessity of coercion, includ-
ing ultimately even war, but not “because one is proud of authority, but because one loves mercy” 
(Augustine, 1997, XIX. 14); 3) it would be far worse if the unrighteous ruled over the righteous 
(ibid., XIX. 15, p. 57).
20 By the end of the 16th century, two different paradigms were formed on issues of international 
justice and, consequently, on issues of war and peace: scholastic and humanistic. The scholastic para-
digm, relying on medieval theologians and jurists of the postglossator school, such as Baldus de Ubal-
dis, and exemplified in Luis de Molina’s work De iustitia et iure, rejects the justification of preven-
tive war or war waged for glory. On the other hand, the humanistic paradigm, based on the Roman 
rhetorical and political tradition and initially exemplified in Alberico Gentili’s work De iure belli, 
emphasizes the idea of a natural and universal human community governed by natural law, which 
then implies the justification and naturalness of subjugating barbarians and infidels. See Tuck (1999).
21 With that in mind, Richard Tuck (1999) doubts whether the lobby of the Peace Palace in The 
Hague is really the most appropriate place for a bust of Hugo Grotius. 
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radical. It seeks to establish the conditions for the termination of wars and the es-
tablishment of a positive and lasting value of political peace. The most prominent 
representatives of this abolitionist perspective are de Saint-Pierre22, Thomas Paine23 
and Immanuel Kant24.
Having distinguished between various layers of meaning and distinctions in 
the concept of war, we will now examine the elementary distinctions in the con-
cept of peace. The concept of peace in European culture is formulated in three main 
contexts and meanings. Firstly, there is the all-encompassing and undifferentiated 
cosmological peace. Ancient philosophers, in a multitude of different statements, 
opposed the supposed original principle of disorder or chaos with the principle of 
order or cosmos. The most systematic of them was Plato, who established on three 
related levels the metaphysical primacy of order, harmony and inaction over disor-
der, movement or emergence, and disharmony. Just as the demiurge, or the creator 
of the orderly world in Plato’s Timaeus, creates a harmonious world from a mul-
titude of different and mutually incompatible beings, so does the statesman, imi-
tating the cosmic order, create a harmonious polis or political community from a 
multitude of human whims, habits and desires (Platon, 1997, 2017). In Republic, 
22 Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s project for perpetual peace, published in 1712, is the first systematic and 
comprehensive plan for lasting peace in Europe, with the exception of Henry IV’s previous plans 
to achieve European peace by relying primarily on the concept of balance of power. Saint-Pierre 
eliminates the unreliable concept of balance of power between the French and Austrian ruling 
houses and seeks institutional guarantees of peace in the form of a political body of united Chris-
tian states, which he calls the League of Europe or European Alliance and which, modeled on the 
“seven sovereignties of the Netherlands or the thirteen sovereignties of Switzerland”, would re-
present a permanent congress or “General Assembly of Europe” in which eighteen Christian states 
would have a vote (De Saint-Pierre, 1984). De Saint-Pierre’s outline for the project of perpetual 
peace, which is to guarantee security and free trade, oscillates between the (con)federalism of so-
vereign states and the modified medieval res publica Christiana. See Riley (1975).
23 Paine envisioned the idea of global peace as an inevitable and self-evident consequence of the 
global revolution spurred by the American and French revolutions in which he himself took an ac-
tive part. With the disappearance of monarchies and aristocracies and with the establishment of 
democratic republics, Paine is convinced that universal peace is guaranteed because “as war is the 
system of government on the old construction, the animosity which nations reciprocally entertain 
is nothing more than what the policy of their governments excites to keep up the spirit of the sys-
tem. Each government accuses the other of perfidy, intrigue, and ambition, as a means of heating 
the imagination of their respective nations, and incensing them to hostilities. Man is not the ene-
my of man, but through the medium of a false system of government” (Paine, 1987: 119-120). 
24 Kant not only considered the demand for abolishing wars a dictate of moral-practical reason 
and deemed the ideal of perpetual peace “the highest practical good” (The Metaphysics of Morals, 
Doctrine of Right, part II, ch. 3, par. 62), but he was also the first in the modern era to regard hu-
mankind as a moral and legal subject, thereby introducing ius cosmopoliticum or the law of world 
citizenship into public law (Kant, 1967 and 2000).
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having previously indicated the order of the world of ideas (cosmic peace) and the 
unity of a political community (political peace), Plato introduces the third dimen-
sion of peace – harmony, “health, beauty, and good condition of the soul” (444 e) or 
psychological peace, which is achieved in a virtuous harmony that gives a person’s 
every motivational power its corresponding place – meaning that the mind is the 
hegemon over will and lust. All these three dimensions of peace – cosmic, political 
and psychological – are made possible by the same homogeneous idea or form of 
the Good, which, through the privileged insight of philosophers, becomes relevant 
and applicable to political and personal life.
3. The Genesis of the Emancipation of the Idea and Value of Political Peace
The essential similarity of the three instances of the idea of Good, and consequently 
the levels of peace, was first questioned by Aristotle with two considerate but also 
directly critical attitudes. “It has been held by some thinkers that beside the many 
good things we have mentioned, there exists another Good, that is good in itself, and 
stands to all those goods as the cause of their being good” (Nicomachean Ethics, 
1096 b). Aristotle strengthens his defense of the diversity and pluralism of goods – 
within the teleological picture of the world – with a critical thesis about the essence 
of the city-state: “Yet it is clear that if the process of unification advances beyond a 
certain point, the city will not be a city at all for a state essentially consists of a mul-
titude of persons, and if its unification is carried beyond a certain point, city will be 
reduced to family and family to individual” (Politics, 1261 a). After a convincing 
argument, Aristotle concludes with the following assertion: “Hence it is manifestly 
possible to be a good citizen without possessing the goodness that constitutes a good 
man” (ibid., 1276 b). In short, Aristotle connected the plurally understood concept of 
good to the realm of human praxis and paved the way for independent examination 
of political harmony or public peace irrespective of cosmic and psychological peace.
In reconstructing the preconditions for the formation and emancipation of the 
modern value of political peace, it seems indispensable to point out the contribu-
tions of three medieval thinkers: Aurelius Augustine, Marsilius of Padua, and Wil-
liam of Ockham. In the new historical, political and theoretical context of the 16th 
and 17th centuries, their rudimentary ideas about political peace gained new layers 
of meaning in the works of Jean Bodin and Hugo Grotius. It was Thomas Hobbes 
who provided a systematic theoretical justification of political peace based on in-
strumental rationality and pragmatic choices, whereas Immanuel Kant developed 
the idea of perpetual world peace from an ethical and legal perspective. Since the 
scope of this paper is limited to an examination of the early genesis of the idea and 
value of political peace, we will consider only the medieval contributions of Aure-
lius Augustine, Marsilius of Padua, and William of Ockham.
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3.1. Aurelius Augustine: Limited Order of Political Peace in the External Harmony 
of Human Wills
Through his theology of the fallen man, Augustine has paradoxically affirmed the 
value of political peace. His transcendent eschatology has indirectly opened two 
perspectives: a) methodically negative or passive anthropocentrism – for despite 
original sin and the human fall from grace, the salvation of mankind (or at least 
those chosen ones) becomes the meaning of all cosmological and historical events; 
b) political realism – by consigning ethical perfection to the afterlife, Augustine re-
alistically approaches the examination of the human psyche, morality, sociability 
and politics (Deane, 1963; Raunić, 2005: 61-88).
The ultimate purpose of man is to achieve the kind of peace that results from 
the harmony between human loves – for Augustine this is the general term for hu-
man passions and desires – and the eternal order of things. True peace, or tranquilli-
tas ordinis, in which all contradictions, conflicts, and oppositions disappear, is pos-
sible only in the afterlife, in the blissful contemplative union of the Christian soul 
with God. Augustine contrasts perfect or heavenly peace with earthly peace, “the 
peace of Babylon”, which “the people call happiness” and which is characterized 
only by the imperfect and temporary absence of war. Augustine has freed earthly 
or political peace from high moral purposes – a political community does not exist 
because of human goodness, but because of human wickedness – and thus, partly 
even against his intention, realistically and far-reachingly determined the meaning 
of the notion of political peace. “The earthly city, which does not live by faith”, 
says Augustine, “seeks an earthly peace, and the end it proposes, in the well-ordered 
concord of civic obedience and rule, is the combination of men’s wills to attain the 
things which are helpful to this life” (De civitate Dei, III, 19.17, p. 61). Earthly 
peace rests on dominia or coercive institutions – of rulers over subjects, masters 
over slaves, and owners over property – which, both as punishment and as a cure 
for sin, bring a certain order into the fragmented order of a sinful condition or self-
destructive anarchy, thus enabling political peace. Such a limited and temporary 
earthly or political peace, though only a pale reflection of heavenly peace, becomes 
in a conceptual sense an admittedly inferior, yet independent subject of research. In 
his theocentric and teleological ontology, Augustine distinguishes several dimen-
sions or degrees of peace. “The peace of the body then consists in the duly propor-
tioned arrangement of its parts. The peace of the irrational soul is the harmonious 
repose of the appetites, and that of the rational soul the harmony of knowledge and 
action. The peace of body and soul is the well-ordered and harmonious life and 
health of the living creature. Peace between man and God is the well-ordered obe-
dience of faith to eternal law. Peace between man and man is well-ordered concord. 
Domestic peace is the well-ordered concord between those of the family who rule 
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and those who obey. Civil peace is a similar concord among the citizens. The peace 
of the celestial city is the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God, and 
of one another in God. The peace of all things is the tranquility of order. Order is 
the distribution which allots things equal and unequal, each to its own place” (ibid., 
19.13, p. 51). Such a connection between Christian dogmatism and the Neoplato-
nic hierarchy of dimensions or types of peace allows Augustine to simultaneously 
place the relationship between heavenly and earthly peace in a tense relationship of 
discontinuity and continuity. It is characterized by discontinuity insofar as, due to 
the perfection, wholeness, and eternity of heavenly peace, “this alone can be truly 
called and esteemed the peace of the reasonable creatures” (ibid., 19.17, p. 63). On 
the other hand, it is a relationship of continuity insofar as the heavenly city, the city 
of God or the community of people living according to God’s word and only so-
journing on earth “calls citizens out of all nations, and gathers together a society of 
pilgrims of all languages, not scrupling about diversities in the manners, laws, and 
institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognizing that, 
however various these are, they all tend to one and the same end of earthly peace. 
It therefore is so far from rescinding and abolishing these diversities, that it even 
preserves and adopts them, so long only as no hindrance to the worship of the one 
supreme and true God is thus introduced” (ibid.). In other words, even though the 
city of God strives towards true heavenly peace, it nevertheless, while on its earthly 
pilgrimage, “avails itself of the peace of earth and desires and maintains a common 
agreement among men regarding the acquisition of the necessaries of life” (ibid.). 
The relative value of earthly peace, even if – in Augustine’s words – only a respite 
between battles, is thereby established nonetheless.
3.2. Marsilius of Padua: The Defense of Peace is the Purpose of Jurisdiction 
and the Source of the Legitimacy of Political Authority
Whereas Augustine outlined in a methodically negative way the distinctiveness of 
earthly or political peace by degrading it and making it merely a deceptive and con-
trasting image of true heavenly peace, Marsilius of Padua, regarded by many as the 
most significant and influential late medieval political philosopher, was the first to 
explain the value of political peace in a methodically positive and systematic way. 
The radicalism of Marsilius’s novelty that led to the emancipation of the value of 
political peace is manifested on two related levels: conceptual and political. At the 
conceptual level, earthly peace ceases to be an instrument of transcendent purposes 
and becomes a self-sufficient value. At the political level, the affirmation of the va-
lue of political peace meant challenging the Church’s pretensions to political power.
Marsilius’s basic starting point is naturalistic – a physician by vocation, he re-
lies on experiential knowledge and induction. On the other hand, he received a hu-
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manistic education at the University of Paris, of which he became rector in 1313, 
and from the position of Averroist Aristotelianism formulated his radically new po-
litical theory.25 The initial naturalism and Averroistic Aristotelianism are mediated 
by the modern idea of man’s self-positioning and mastering the conditions of hu-
man cohabitation. Correct knowledge, Marsilius argues, empowers action, while 
ignorance leads to resignation to fate. Marsilius’s argumentative strategy follows 
the logic of medical practice. The first step is to diagnose the condition and deter-
mine the causes, as Marsilius himself asserts, of society’s diseases, which he finds 
in unregulated conflicts destroying society that result from the absence of a uni-
form criterion or framework for social and political action. Overlapping authorities 
with indistinguishable jurisdictions and modes of operation allow the shenanigans 
of certain strata of society that disturb the balance and harmony of people’s life to-
gether. The main cause of social unrest and threat to the political community are 
the unjustified pretensions of the Roman bishop and his church – as Marsilius most 
often refers to the pope – to civil and political power. The immediate historical and 
political context of Marsilius’s radical political philosophy is the rejection of Pope 
John XXII to crown Louis IV of Bavaria and recognize his imperial succession.26 
25 The extent of novelty of Marsilius’s political theory is also evidenced by Pope Clement VI’s claim 
that “we had never read a worse heretic than Marsilius”, since as many as 240 articles from his work 
were declared heretical. Cited from Annabel Brett’s “Introduction” in: Marsilius of Padua, 2005: xi.
26 Rivalries and conflicts between ecclesiastical and imperial authority in the early 14th century 
began with a fierce conflict between the French King Philip IV the Fair, who, due to the war with 
England, intended to tax the clergy, and Pope Boniface VIII. The pope convened a church council 
and on November 18, 1302 issued the bull Unam sanctam in which he repeated the classic argu-
ments – since salvation requires the necessary subjection of every man to the ecclesiastical autho-
rity and, consequently, the supremacy of ecclesiastical authority over the secular power, no part 
of church revenues can be taxed without the explicit consent of the pope. Philip IV convoked an 
assembly of all the estates of France and, as their representative and holder of executive power, 
condemned the pope and proclaimed imperial jurisdiction over the clergy. After eighteen months 
of preparations, Pope Boniface VIII intended to announce the excommunication of Philip IV on 
September 8, 1303, but on the very night before the announcement, the king’s troops led by Wil-
liam Nogaret stormed the papal palace at Anagni demanding that the pope resign, restore the 
privileges of the Colonna family, and hand over all available money. The pope refused, but the 
locals managed to free him in the morning. A month later, Pope Boniface VIII died and Philip IV 
threatened to initiate a posthumous trial against him for heresy, fornication and larceny. The new 
popes, Benedict XI and Clement V, were forced to make concessions to the imperial government, 
including the abolition of the Templars (March 22, 1312) and the confiscation of their consider-
able wealth. The open conflict between imperial and papal power broke out again in the third de-
cade of the 14th century, between Louis IV of Bavaria and Pope John XXII. Louis IV of Bavaria 
and Frederick III of Austria, due to double elections in the Holy Roman Empire, simultaneously 
claimed the imperial throne. Both sought the support of Pope John XXII, who wanted to secure the 
independence of the Italian papal state which was the source of income for the papacy at Avignon. 
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Pope John XII used the excuse of the emptied throne to strengthen his demand for 
plenitudo potestatis – complete or absolute power encompassing both spiritual and 
secular authority – on the basis of which he not only excommunicated Louis IV of 
Bavaria, but also contested his right to the imperial throne.
The theoretical context of Marsilius’s work is the central medieval philosophi-
cal-political debate concerning political priority and rivalry between ecclesiastical 
and political authority, ecclesia militans and regnum, sacerdotium and imperium. 
On the ecclesiastical side, this discussion was first doctrinally shaped in the 5th cen-
tury by Pope Gelasius, Augustine’s contemporary, with the doctrine of duo sunt – 
two swords. Fallen human nature desperately needs restraint and some principle of 
order as punishment for the original sin, as well as a cure for sin as such. The eccle-
siastical sword is sharper because it cares for the soul and eternal salvation even of 
the ruler himself, and thus has precedence over secular authority.27 The problem of 
double obligation – which claim, ecclesiastical or secular, should be given priority 
and why? – has led to a series of political crises and conflicts. This prompted Mar-
silius of Padua to put forth, in a radical reversal of the traditional view, a new the-
ory of the legitimacy and role of political authority. In a kind of pre-Machiavellian 
turn, Marsilius directly and unreservedly advocates the subjectivity and primacy of 
political power as a necessary condition for the survival and stability of a political 
community, thereby paving the way for the first theories of sovereignty.28 
Marsilius uses traditional tenets for new needs. He accepts Aristotle’s view 
that a political community is self-sufficient and that its purpose is the cultivation 
The pope took advantage of the contest for the crown and the emptied throne and appointed Robert 
of Naples imperial vicar in Italy. In 1322, Louis of Bavaria succeeded in defeating his rival Frede-
rick of Austria and demanded that, as the victorious contender for the imperial throne, he should be 
recognized and crowned by the pope, which John XXII rejected. Moreover, because of protesting 
against the pope’s interference and exercising ruling authority without the pope’s consent, Louis 
was excommunicated on March 23, 1324, and his subjects were released from the political obliga-
tion of obedience. To this Louis responded by convening a general council and issuing the Appeal 
of Sachsenhausen (May 22, 1324) in which he accused the pope of using faith for personal interests 
and called him a heretic. With the aid of the Ghibellines, supporters of imperial rule, Louis of Ba-
varia, accompanied by Marsilius of Padua, came all the way to Rome, where he was crowned with 
the imperial crown given to him by the representatives of the Roman people. On April 18, 1328, 
he deposed Pope John XXII and appointed the antipope Nicholas V, but failed to establish a stable 
order in Italy. See Ullmann (2003).
27 Such an explanation of the primacy of ecclesiastical authority extends all the way to Thomas 
Aquinas and the doctrine of two lights, the sun and the moon, which with unequal power show us 
the right path to salvation. In the modern era, the doctrine of the relationship between ecclesiastical 
and political power takes on a more sophisticated form of political theology.
28 Marsilius’s conceptual turn paves the way for Bodin’s doctrine of sovereignty as a political way 
out of unresolvable religious conflicts.
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of virtues, but immediately adds – in a naturalistic vein – that peace is a necessary 
precondition for this.29 Therefore, political peace is conditio sine qua non and an 
Archimedean point upon which all derived purposes of the political community are 
based. Marsilius poses the question of the legitimacy of political authority – who 
should govern, for what reasons and in what way – from the perspective of politi-
cal peace as the first condition and virtue of public life.30 The negative condition 
for the stability and peace of a political community consists in exposing those who 
incite social divisions and threaten peace, which is exactly what Marsilius sees in 
the pope’s illegitimate pretensions to civil and political jurisdiction. This is particu-
larly evident in the acquisition of property, as opposed to the original evangelical 
poverty, and in the pursuit of coercive jurisdiction, as opposed to the doctrinal role 
of spiritual teachers and their power of persuasion. Such misuse of ecclesiastical 
and papal authority, which creates social conflicts and divisions, culminates in the 
illegitimate papal demand for plenitudo potestatis – complete, absolute power that 
subjugates secular rulers as well.
The positive conditions of peace, as Marsilius systematically argues in Defen-
sor pacis31, presuppose determining two things: the common criteria or standard of 
socially and politically (im)permissible actions, and the subject or bearer of such 
a standard. The first thing, a general, equal and binding standard that needs to be 
knowable and have coercive power, refers to law. Laws, according to Marsilius, are 
either divine or human. Divine law, in so far as it concerns humankind, is know-
able, but has no coercive power in this world – not because God has no coercive 
power, but because God has given people free will and the possibility of repentance 
in this world. God’s rewards and punishments are confined only to the afterlife and, 
29 For the motto of his central work, Defensor pacis, Marsilius takes the words of Cassiodorus, 
a 6th-century Roman official: “Every realm must desire tranquility, under which peoples prosper 
and the profit of the nations is safeguarded.” He then strengthens this argument about peace as 
the central virtue of public life with the theological argument about peace as a sign and message 
of Christ’s birth. See Marsilius of Padua (2005, Discourse I, ch. 1, p. 3).
30 Marsilius begins his Defensor pacis with a plea for peace and by invoking Cassiodorus for 
whom the peace of the community is a precondition for everything that is good, and then in the 
concluding chapters systematically rounds off his work and explains its title: “This treatise will be 
called The Defender of the Peace, because it discusses and explains the particular causes by which 
civil peace or tranquility is preserved and exists, and also those through which its opposite, strife, 
arises, is prevented and is removed” (2005, Discourse III, ch. 3, p. 557).
31 Defensor pacis was written in 1324 and initially circulated anonymously in Parisian intellec-
tual circles. When Marsilius was identified as its author in 1326, he fled from Paris and took re-
fuge at the court of Louis IV of Bavaria, whom he helped in the fight against papal pretensions to 
political power. Towards the end of his life, in 1339, Marsilius wrote Defensor minor, in which 
he elaborated and explained how to apply the ideas put forth in Defensor pacis. See Marsilius of 
Padua (1993).
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therefore, the Church’s demand for coercive jurisdiction in this world is illegitimate 
and unjustified. Therefore, in this earthly life, there remains only the authority of 
human law. But who – and why – is the subject or bearer of the law – that is, the 
legislator? In answering this question, Marsilius relies on the republican tradition 
and Averroistic Aristotelianism and brings a far-reaching novelty – the legislator is 
the universitas civium or the universal body of citizens which represents “an eye 
resulting from many eyes, i.e. an understanding forged from the understanding of 
many...” (Marsilius, 2005, I. 2, p. 60). The arguments for these claims are of episte-
mological as well as moral and political nature. The epistemological argument re-
lies in part on Aristotle who allows the possibility that a united multitude, precisely 
because it is united, makes more prudent decisions than any person would make 
for themselves.32 The moral and political argument lies in the fact that if everyone 
participates in law-making, laws will benefit everyone and no one will have valid 
reasons to protest against them. The primary legislator or the universal body of citi-
zens, Marsilius allows, can be represented by its pars valentior, the prevailing part 
consisting of noblemen, or monarchical authority. 
The significance of Marsilius of Padua for modern political philosophy and the 
affirmation of the value of political peace is threefold. Firstly, Marsilius starts from 
the conflicting nature of sociability and, against the prevailing moralistic perspec-
tive that admonishes the fallen human nature, builds his political theory on the legal 
regulation of conflict which then enables the order, stability and peace of a political 
community. Secondly, Marsilius’s political philosophy, by emphasizing the human 
legislator and the primacy of universitas civium (body of citizens) over universi-
tas fidelium (body of believers), reversed the position of Thomas Aquinas and pre-
Machiavellianly enabled the independence and emancipation of the political realm. 
Thirdly – and in the context of our topic, most importantly – Marsilius’s political 
philosophy has, in principle, established the value of political peace as the foremost 
virtue of public morality without which no other value of living together is possible. 
The primary task of political authority, Marsilius asserts (and also emphasizes with 
the very title of his work) is to be the defender of peace.
3.3. William of Ockham: Theological Reasons for Rejecting the Papal Claim 
to Plenitudo Potestatis
Whereas Marsilius of Padua refuted the papal claim to absolute power from a secu-
lar position, thereby defending civil peace, his contemporary William of Ockham 
reached almost identical theoretical and political conclusions from the opposite theo-
32 See Aristotle, Politics (1988, 1281 a – 1281 b). One should keep in mind that Aristotle takes a 
moderate stance on this issue, arguing that “though not free from difficulty, [it] seems  to contain 
an element of truth”.
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logical position. Ockham repeatedly points out that the papal claim to plenitudo 
potestatis – absolute power33 that also includes political jurisdiction with coercive 
power – is contrary to the evangelical spirit and mission of the Christian church. 
Ockham’s theoretical starting point and primary goal is to defend the moral purity 
and authenticity of Christian teachings. Such an intention, by a confluence of his-
torical and theoretical circumstances, brought him to the center of two great and re-
lated polemics that would lead to important philosophical and political conclusions 
about the nature of and relationship between ecclesiastical and secular authority, as 
well as a well-ordered and stable political community. 
William of Ockham, a Franciscan philosopher and theologian at Oxford Uni-
versity – particularly eminent in the fields of logic and metaphysics, and called 
Doctor Invincibilis (Unconquerable Teacher) – in the 1320s became involved, at the 
request and encouragement of Michael of Cesena, the general of the Franciscan or-
der, in the Church’s internal dispute over the moral value of poverty.34 The opinion 
of radical Franciscans – the so-called spiritualists – was that poverty exemplified 
the ideal of humility and penance for sins, as well as the supremacy of spirituality 
over worldly values. The ideal of poverty as a path of moral perfection meant that 
the Franciscans used things but did not accept ownership of them. In other words, 
when it came to things and property, they accepted the moral status of usus or use, 
but not the moral and legal status of dominium or proprietas. In contrast, Pope John 
XXII, in a series of proclamations, invoked Roman law and insisted that one could 
not use material goods justly without having ownership rights over them35 – pro-
perty is immanent and essential to man and, therefore, exists by divine law even in 
the Garden of Eden. The Franciscans, on the other hand, insisted on the difference 
between iura poli – rights under moral or natural laws – and iura fori – rights under 
33 The term plenitudo potestatis initially meant the delegated power of papal legates fully autho-
rized to act as the pope’s representatives. By the late 13th and early 14th centuries, this term had 
taken on a wider meaning within the papal hierocratic theories and implied a view according to 
which the pope had the highest authority in both ecclesiastical and secular affairs. For the meaning 
of the term plentiudo potestatis and the differences in its interpretations, both those at the time and 
contemporary ones, see McCready (1973).
34 An instructive study on the moral value of poverty is provided by Marina Miladinov in her in-
troduction to the collection of Ockham’s writings published as Opera Politica (2001), especially in 
the first chapter “Extreme Poverty and Papal Heresy”. See also Kilcullen (2006).
35 A compromise solution for the moral and legal status of property, aiming to mitigate the radi-
calism of the Franciscan spiritualists, was proposed as early as 1270 by Bonaventure in his work 
Apologia pauperum, in which he advocates a relation to material goods that in the moral and legal 
sense goes beyond the right of immediate and mere use of goods (usus), and yet it is not propri-
etary because goods belong to others. Pope Nicholas III accepted this conciliatory solution, while 
his successor Pope John XXII explicitly rejected it in the bull Ad conditorem canonum of 1322.
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human law – and claimed that the institution of property was a human creation es-
tablished by custom or agreement after the Fall and that, therefore, it fell within the 
remit of positive human legislation.
From the issue of the moral value of poverty and the status of property, the de-
bate between these irreconcilable views moves onto the theological-political ques-
tion of heresy. Michael of Cesena and William of Ockham were convinced that the 
pope was heretically deviating from Christian teaching. However, after the Thom-
ist John Lutterell, chancellor of Oxford University, accused him of heresy and pro-
posed an examination of his 56 suspicious theses, Ockham was summoned before 
the papal court at Avignon in 1324. Together with the general of his Franciscan or-
der, Michael of Cesena, and other Michaelists, Ockham responded to the summons, 
but as the debate about heresy progressed, the Franciscans realized how it would 
end – and probably they as well – so they decided to escape first to Pisa and then 
to the court of Louis IV of Bavaria. In 1328, Ockham renounced his obedience to 
the pope, who in turn excommunicated him that same year. Thus began the third 
and for political philosophy most far-reaching level of debate, which was no longer 
concerned only with the moral status of poverty and property, or the question of or-
thodoxy and heresy, but with the nature and purpose of papal authority and its rela-
tion to imperial authority.
Delineating the jurisdictions of ecclesiastical and political power on the basis 
of the correct understanding of the nature of their respective authority becomes for 
Ockham a crucial theoretical and political task that should enable the elimination 
of social and political conflicts and guarantee political peace. Ockham’s strategy, 
unlike Marsilius’s, is not aimed at establishing primacy between the two authori-
ties, but rather it tries to primarily clarify their different natures, jurisdictions and 
types of action. Therefore, Ockham elevated political and constitutive questions to 
the level of epistemological questions. His aim is to preserve and protect the purity 
of the moral values of the Christian community from the political encroachments 
of heretical popes.36 Ockham in fact defends the spiritual authority of the Christian 
leader by distinguishing between the Avignon popes and the Holy See, and argu-
ing that the ecclesiastical mission can be accomplished only by refraining from 
meddling in worldly affairs – he opposes the papal claim to plenitudo potestatis 
with “a perfect freedom of the law of the Gospel” (Ockham, 2001b, XI, p. 421).
The argumentation for refuting the papal claim to absolute power simultane-
ously relies on theological reinterpretations and natural law tenets consistent with 
Ockham’s ontological nominalism and theological voluntarism (Gillespie, 2008; 
36 Ockham persisted in his views and after 1328 wrote not only against John XXII, but also against 
his successors Benedict XII and Clement VI. See Canning (1996). 
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Coleman, 1999). Ockham contextually interprets Christ’s words to Peter – “What-
ever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven” (Matthew 16.19) – which Pope 
Innocent III emphasized as a key argument in favor of the demand for absolute, 
secular and spiritual authority. Although these words were uttered generally, it is 
clear from the context that they refer to the question of sin, repentance and absolu-
tion (Ockham, 2001a). Ockham strengthens his interpretation by invoking Christ’s 
words from the Gospel of John – “the kingdom of God is not of this world” – and 
affirmative testimonies from Augustine’s writings. Papal power “in no way regu-
larly extends to temporals and to worldly affairs” (Ockham, 2001b, II, p. 397), just 
as it does not extend to “anything beyond Christian duties” (III, 399) – it is limited 
only to “those things which are necessary to the salvation and rule and governance 
of the faithful, respecting always the possessions, rights and liberties of others...” 
(VII, 411). This means, Ockham concludes, that papal power is ministerial or ‘of 
service’, and not dominative or ‘of lordship’ (VI, 407 and VII, 411). It rests on per-
suasion and counsel, not on command and coercion, because otherwise “the evan-
gelical law would become a law of servitude” (XI, 425). The highness of apostolic 
rule consists in three things: “Firstly, that it is in respect of spirituals... secondly, 
that it is in respect of free persons, not slaves, because by divine law none is the 
slave of the pope...” (XIII, 429). The third thing concerns emergencies that cannot 
be determined in advance and during which the pope may exceptionally do “all 
those things which are necessary for the rule and government of the faithful, even 
though ordinarily and regularly certain limits have been set to his power, which he 
is not regularly permitted to overstep” (XIII, 431). Decisions about such emergen-
cies during which the pope is “permitted to do things which are in no way regularly 
allowed him” would be made by “the council of the wisest men... if they can be 
had...” (XIII, 431).
If the pope violates the principles of apostolic rule and illegitimately and un-
lawfully reaches out for absolute power, the ruler can prosecute him for every crime 
committed against civil laws. Moreover, in exceptional cases of heretical popes, the 
ruler may convene a general council to adjudicate religious disputes. If the coun-
cil makes an erroneous judgment, then, as Ockham points out, moral authority is 
transferred not only to the ruler, but also to the individual conscience of every single 
Christian believer.
In Ockham’s political theory, conflicts between imperial and papal authority 
are, in principle, resolved in two ways. On the one hand, Ockham precisely defines 
and separates the jurisdictions and modes of operation of the two authorities. On 
the other hand, he resorts to powerful natural law rhetoric or awareness of natural 
equity consistent with right reason, limiting the scope of ecclesiastical and political 
authority, which places Ockham among the founders of the long-standing and in-
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fluential tradition of natural law. In both of these ways, Ockham’s primary goal – to 
restore the credibility and supremacy of Christian virtues – implicitly leads to the 
emancipation of political purposes, that is, the stability of the political community 
and civil or political peace (Shogimen, 2007).
4. Towards the Idea of Global Political Peace
After a conceptual analysis and historical examination of the idea and value of po-
litical peace at the turn of the late Middle Ages and the early modern era, we shall 
conclude this paper by indicating the directions in which the value of political peace 
developed in the early modern age. On the one hand, there was the systematic ar-
ticulation of political peace as an expression of a distinct political morality, as op-
posed to metaphysical (or worldview) peace as an expression of a comprehensive 
religious or philosophical morality. Such a path of abstraction from comprehensive 
moralities, which abandoned grounding political institutions in metaphysical truths 
and essential propositions about human nature, was a much-needed result of the ef-
forts to find a theoretical way out of unresolvable religious and worldview conflicts 
of the 16th and 17th centuries.37
Bodin’s mature theory of sovereignty is essentially nothing but an effort to con-
struct, following Marsilius’s understanding of political authority as the defender of 
peace, the supreme authority that can effectively guarantee the unity and stability of 
the political community and curb violent conflicts between groups of citizens of dif-
ferent religious affiliations and worldviews.38 Bodin’s theory of sovereignty, which 
still bore the mark of personal rule, was systematically developed by Hobbes in the 
form of an abstract and impersonal conception of political authority or modern state 
whose main task is to guarantee political peace. Hobbes achieves this primarily 
with a rudimentary conceptual distinction between the political and the social, the 
public and the private, political obligation and civil liberty consisting in the silence 
of the law, where laws prescribe not what should be done, but what should not be 
done, or where the boundaries are – albeit set by the sovereign’s discretionary deci-
sion – at which the threat to political peace begins.
The second direction of development of the idea of political peace concerns 
the international or global level, because the constitution of peace within individual 
political communities has often been only a precondition for international conflicts 
37 Consistent separation of political morality from comprehensive worldview morality – that is, 
the use and expansion of the structure of tolerance – is also at the basis of Rawls’s later efforts to 
justify his theory of political justice as fairness. See Rawls (1999 and 2000).
38 See Bodin (2002), and for an inter pretation, see Franklin (1973), as well as a very instructive 
study by Dragutin Lalović (2002), published as the afterword to the Croatian edition of Bodin’s 
work.
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and large-scale war destruction. The pioneering role in the field of international law 
– and only implicitly and conditionally of political peace as well – belongs to Hugo 
Grotius, who, like other modern political theorists, is not in the focus of this paper. 
Suffice it to say that Grotius constructs international law in a methodological pa-
rallel between the individual and the state, basing it on natural law that allows for 
self-defense and following self-interest without directly harming others. The ambi-
guity of Grotius’s position lies in the fact that, on the one hand, he seeks to legally 
regulate international relations, while on the other hand, by extensively interpreting 
the right to self-defense, which also includes the elimination of threats and the right 
to administer punishment, he actually justifies the colonial campaigns of the Dutch 
East India Company. For this reason, Kant, who was the first to establish an articu-
lated ethical-legal paradigm of world political peace, can sarcastically point out that 
“... Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf, Vatell and the rest (sorry comforters as they are) are 
still dutifully quoted in justification of military aggression” (Kant, 2000: 125). By 
contrast, Kant’s novelty, undoubtedly relevant in our time as well, is that the value 
of political peace, in order for it to be perpetual, is supported by two radical ideas: 
an ethical proposition about humanity as a moral subject and a legal proposition 
about cosmopolitan law which treats people as citizens of a universal state of hu-
man beings, that is, a world peace federation.
Reflections on the moral tendencies in the history of humankind from a broad 
observational perspective point to the relevance and topicality of Kant’s paradigm, 
despite criticisms of his occasionally excessive Enlightenment optimism and belief 
in the inevitability of progress. The historical process of the generalization of will 
and moral progress takes place, according to Kant, through two related but opposite 
processes. The first one is the historically prevailing process of indirect constitution 
of the generality of institutions through antagonisms and armed conflicts – that is, 
through the “unsocial sociability of men” (ibid.: 22). Based on the premises of his 
teleological metaphysics of nature, Kant is convinced that painful and tragic experi-
ences of destruction “through discord lead to harmony” (ibid.: 130). The opposite 
process of direct and reflective learning of humankind, which attests to the degree 
of its liberation from the state of war, is based precisely on the concept of political 
peace and international justice. World peace is not a utopian algorithm that abo-
lishes all antagonisms and conflicts, but rather it seeks to minimize them through 
political justice and to resolve them in a civilized and responsive manner beyond 
war violence.
Raunić, R., The Genesis of the Idea and Value of Political Peace...
57
REFERENCES
Arendt, Hannah. 1969. On Violence. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. San Diego.
Aristotel. 1988. Nikomahova etika. SNL. Zagreb.
Aristotel. 1988a. Politika. SNL. Zagreb.
Augustin, Aurelije. 1973. Ispovijesti. Kršćanska sadašnjost. Zagreb.
Augustin, Aurelije. 1982-1996. O državi Božjoj. Vol. 1-3. Kršćanska sadašnjost. Zagreb.
Barnes, Jonathan. 1997. The Just War, in: Kretzmann, N. and Kenny, A. (eds.): The Cam-
bridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge U. P. Cambridge: 771-
784.
Benjamin, Walter. 1971. Uz kritiku sile. Studentski centar Sveučilišta u Zagrebu. Zagreb.
Berlin, Isaiah. 2013. The Originality of Machiavelli, in: Against the Current. Princeton 
U. P. Princeton: 33-100.
Bodin, Jean. 2002. Šest knjiga o republici (selection). Politička kultura. Zagreb.
Bottici, Chiara. 2007. A Philosophy of Political Myth. Cambridge U. P. Cambridge.
Boyle, Joseph. 1996. Just War Thinking in Catholic Natural Law, in: Nardin, T., The 
Ethics of War and Peace. Princeton U. P. Princeton: 40-53. 
Canning, Joseph. 1996. A History of Medieval Political Thought 300 – 1450. Routledge. 
London. 
Coleman, Janet. 1999. Ockham’s Right Reason and the Genesis of the Political as ‘Ab-
solutist’. History of Political Thought, (20), 1: 35-64.
De Saint-Pierre. 1984. Projekt vječnog mira. Predgovor. Glavne ideje projekta (ed. Joka, 
M.). Kulturni radnik, (37), 4: 187-200.
Deane, Herbert. 1963. The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustin. Columbia U. P. 
New York.
Erasmus of Rotterdam. 1917 (1521). The Complaint of Peace. The Open Court Publish-
ing Co. Chicago.
Fiala, Andrew (ed.). 2018. The Routledge Handbook of Pacifism and Nonviolence. Rout-
ledge. New York. 
Fiala, Andrew. 2018a. Transformative pacifism: Critical Theory and Practise. Blooms-
bury Academic. London.
Finnis, John. 1996. The Ethics of War and Peace in the Catholic Natural Law Tradition, 
in: Nardin, Terry (ed.): The Ethics of War and Peace. Princeton U. P. Princeton: 15-
39.
Franklin, Julian H. 1973. Jean Bodin and the Rise of Absolutist Theory. Cambridge U. P. 
Cambridge. 
Gillespie, Michael Allen. 2008. The Theological Origins of Modernity. The University 
of Chicago Press. Chicago.
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 57, No. 4, 2020, pp. 33-59
58
Hegel, G. W. Friedrich. 1987. Enciklopedija filozofijskih znanosti. V. Masleša. Sarajevo.
Hegel, G. W. Friedrich. 1989. Osnovne crte filozofije prava. V. Masleša. Sarajevo.
Hobbes, Thomas (ed. C. B. Macpherson). 1985. Leviathan. Penguin Books. Harmonds-
worth.
Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence (eds.). 2007. The Invention of Tradition. Cam-
bridge U. P. Cambridge.
Kant, Immanuel. 1967. Metafizika ćudoređa. Veselin Masleša. Sarajevo. 
Kant, Immanuel. 2000. Pravno-politički spisi (ed. Posavec, Z.). Politička kultura. Za-
greb.
Kilcullen, John. 2006. The Political Writings, in: Spade, P. V. (ed.): The Cambridge 
Companion to Ockham. Cambridge U. P. Cambridge: 302-325.
Lalović, Dragutin. 2002. Plaidoyer za državu u Bodinovoj science politique. Afterword 
in Bodin, 2002.
Locke, John. 2003. Two Treatises of Government (ed. Laslett, P.). Cambridge U. P. Cam-
bridge.
Löwith, Karl. 1990. Svjetska povijest i događanje spasa. A. Cesarec. Zagreb.
Machiavelli, Niccolò. 2014. Vladar. Nakladni zavod Globus. Zagreb. 
Marsiglio of Padua. 1993. Defensor minor and De translatione Imperii (ed. Cary J. Ne-
derman). Cambridge U. P. Cambridge.
Marsilius of Padua. 2005. The Defender of Peace. Cambridge U. P. Cambridge. 
Marx, Karl. 1974. Kapital. Vol. 1. Prosveta. Beograd. 
Marx, Karl. 1976. Privatno vlasništvo i komunizam, in: Marx/Engels, Rani radovi. Na-
prijed. Zagreb: 272-287. 
McCready, William D. 1973. Papal plenitudo potestatis and the Source of Temporal Au-
thority in Late Medieval Papal Hierocratic Theory. Speculum, (48), 4: 654-674.
Mikecin, Igor. 2013. Heraklit. Matica hrvatska. Zagreb.
Monneyron, F. and Mouchtouris, A. (eds.). 2012. Politički mitovi. Tim Press. Zagreb. 
Nardin, Terry (ed.). 1996. The Ethics of War and Peace. Princeton U. P. Princeton. 
Neuhouser, Frederick. 2008. Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality, and the 
Drive for Recognition. Oxford U. P. Oxford.
Ockham, Vilim. 2001a. Kratak spis o tiranskoj vladavini, in: Opera politica. Demetra. 
Zagreb: 55-221.
Ockham, Vilim. 2001b. O carskoj i papinskoj vlasti, in: Opera Politica. Demetra. Za-
greb: 287-461.
Paine, Thomas. 1987. Prava čovjeka i drugi spisi. Informator/FPN. Zagreb.
Platon. 1997. Država. Naklada Jurčić. Zagreb.
Platon. 2017. Timej, in: Barbarić, D. (ed.): Skladba svijeta. Matica hrvatska. Zagreb.
Raunić, R., The Genesis of the Idea and Value of Political Peace...
59
Pocock, J. G. A. 1975. The Machiavellian Moment. Princeton U. P. Princeton. 
Puhovski, Žarko. 2003. Rat – nastavak moralnosti drugim sredstvima?, in: Roić, S. and 
Ivić, N. (eds.): Predrag Matvejević: Književnost, kultura, angažman. Prometej. Za-
greb. 
Puhovski, Žarko. 2015. (Ne)moralnost mira? Peščanik.net, May 29.
Puhovski, Žarko. 2018. Postmoderni pacifizam. Ideje.hr, February 20.
Raunić, Raul. 2005. Pretpostavke liberalnog razumijevanja čovjeka. Hrvatsko filozof-
sko društvo. Zagreb.
Raunić, Raul. 2014. Rousseauov politički emancipacijski projekt. Filozofska istraživanja, 
(34), 1-2: 5-22.
Raunić, Raul. 2018. Revolucije i legitimnost, in: Mikulić / Žitko (eds.): Filozofija re-
volucija i ideje novih svjetova. Filozofski fakultet. Zagreb: 14-49.
Rawls, John. 1999. Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, in: Rawls, Collected 
Papers (ed. S. Freeman). Harvard U. P. Cambridge: 388-414. 
Rawls, John. 2000. Politički liberalizam. Kruzak. Zagreb.
Riley, Patrick. 1975. The Abbe de St. Pierre and Voltaire on Perpetual Peace in Europe. 
World Affairs (137), 3: 186-194.
Schmitt, Carl. 2007. Politički spisi. Politička kultura. Zagreb.
Shogimen, Takashi. 2007. Ockham and Political Discourse in the Late Middle Ages. 
Cambridge U. P. Cambridge. 
Tuck, Richard. 1999. The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the Interna-
tional Order from Grotius to Kant. Oxford U. P. Oxford. 
Tudor, Henry. 1972. Political Myth. Macmillan. London.
Ullmann, Walter. 2003. A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages. Routledge. 
London. 
Walzer, Michael. 1969. The Revolutions of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical 
Politics. Atheneum. New York.
Walzer, Michael. 1977. Just and Unjust War. Perseus. New York.
Walzer, Michael. 2004. Arguing about War. Yale University Press. New Haven. 
Žižek, Slavoj. 2008. O nasilju. Naklada Ljevak. Zagreb. 
Mailing Address: Raul Raunić, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Uni-
versity of Zagreb, Ivana Lučića 3, 10 000 Zagreb. E-mail: rraunic@m.ffzg.hr
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 57, No. 4, 2020, pp. 33-59
